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I.

Introduction
This paper will present.a framework for viewing North-South economic

relations which, it is hoped, will facilitate positive analysis, and
contribute toward normative prescriptions regarding the desirable trend
of North-South economic relations in the future.
Possible social and economic typologies of "Southern", or less develope(._
countries (LDCs), will first be explored, as international economic links
differ in ioportance among groups of states.
econony

Key features-of the political

of the "Northern countries" (DCs) will also be examined.

The

arena of interaction between North and South will then be discussed,
focusing on fundamental asymmetries in the working of the international
economic system.

This will be followed by more detailed analysis of inter

national commodity and factor markets.

The impiications of such analysis

for international aid and economic monetary reform will be discussed toward
the end of the paper.
The economist will quickly recognize the basic theme of this essay:
the analysis of different types of international markets, viewed as more
or less desirable mechanisms for handling economic interdependence among
nations.

The desirability of such mechanisms will be judged not only on

the basis of their purely economic efficiency, but also on whether they
help or hinder the achievement of other national goals.

The point is to
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search for mechanis~s to handle international interdependence which are
compatible with the pursuit of a variety of purely national goals.

The

search is motivated by the assumption that two apparently contradictory
forces will continue to dominate this century:

a technology which makes

the international division of labor econOC1ically attractive, and a
desire for political and cultural self-determinat ion of states and/ or
ethnic groups.
The paper will view markets as creatures of social and political
systems, not as mechanisms arising spontaneously and inevitably out of
economic necessity.

Which markets are allowed to operate and how, which

are encouraged and which are repressed are political decisions, both
nationally and internationally .

On the other hand, there are.in some

cases technical difficulties which even a £inn political will to create

an international market may be unable to overcome at reasonable social
costs.

Other mechanisms may then be called upon to handle international

interdependenc e.
II.

The South:

Types and Strategies

LDC economic and political heterogeneity, more so than that of DCs,
presents a. difficult barrier to generalizations about North-South relations.
But postwar research on LDCs has yielded some "laws of development," which
can be helpful in sorting out a manageable number of LDC types, at least
in the economic sphere.

The work of Kuznets and Chenery, in particular, has isolated certain
impressive regularities in the path toward higher per capita income. 1
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Huch of the observed variation in the productive structure and export
pattern of LDCs can be econooetrically explained by per capita income and
by population.

A third important variable is the endowment of natural

resources of a givea ccuntry.
LDC, per capita

ir.cJ'"-::l,

In other words, if one knows, for a given

po,)ulation and resource endm-1t1en t (somehow

quantified), one can ~ilke a very good guess about the structure of pro
duction anci foreign tr.~.i,;: in th.it country.
One can thus differentiate between large and small LDCs, and between
those relatively rich in natural resources and those which are not.

As

each type of country naves up the per capita incane ladder, its productive
and international trade structures will change in a fairly predictable
way, given contemporary technology.

A large, resource-poor country with

a low per capita income, such as India, will have different priorities
for its economic interactions with DCs, than a smaller, relatively resource
rich LDC, already well along the per capita

income ladder, such as Chile.

The Kuznets-Chener y empirical patterns of growth also suggest that once
the three major objective facts listed in the previous. paragraph are taken
into account, the key variable influencing changes in productive and trade
structure is the growth rate of per capita income.

Domestic policies, this

line of thought would arcue, will affect those structures mainly via their
impact on per capita incane growth.

Indeed, domestic policies trying to

change those structures directly, in contradiction with the three objective
facts, will simply decrease the growth rate, without much changing the
productive and trade structures of the country (e.g.,·the case of Uruguay,

-4-

which defied.its "fate" or pattern as a small, resource-rich country).
The above has a deter..iinistic flavor leaving little room, apparently,
for policy innovation, except insofar as it can accelerate ~rowth.

It

could be countered, inter alia• that such generalizations are based on
observations of more or less .market-oriented LDCs. leaving aside the
experience of socialist countries.

Yet, there is some evidence suggest

inG that the invariance of productive structures except to the three
objective variables also extends to socialist countries.

It could be that

the major difference between a socialist and a capitalist LDC of the same
per capita incane, population and natural resource endowment ·will be not
in productive and foreign trade structure, but on the structure and dis
tribution of public and private consunption and investment.

The str~king

originality most observers find in the Cuban economy, for example, does
not certainly lie in its production and trade structure, which probably
fits well in the Kuznets-Chenery patterns.

But. more evidence is certainly

needed in the comparison of socialist and non-s~cialist trade, production
and expenditure structures.

The experiences of the Peoples' Republic of

China, in particular, are only beginning to be incorporated systematically
into development studies.

It remains to be seen whether and when sucn

incorporation will yield another Indian-type observation, or something
qualitatively different.
So some of the detenninistic flavor arising from the descriptive
"laws of development" disappears when one considers the_political and economic possibility that a given pattern of production and trade, broadly defined,
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will be co~patibl e with more than one pattern of expenditu res and income
distribut ion.

Tl1e latter patterns tr..ay differ in the balance of consumpti on

of private an<l public goods, in the level of other social services, in the
equity of inccne distribut ion, etc.

A priori, one could argue that such

differenc e., will be re£1-ec ted in the pattern of productio n and trade.

The

hypothesi s is that the link is weak, and overshado wed by the three variables
discussed earlier.
This hypothesi s receives some support from recent simulatio n exercises
showing that even radical redistrib ution experimen ts affect the sectorial
compositi on of gross output only modestly, and that resulting indirect
effects on importati on, and on capital and labor use are correspon dingly nodest.
Moreover , even or more concentra ted income distribut ions seem feasible
under a variety of b~sic developme nt strategie s. 2
From the above it follows that in today's world the manner in which
the internati onal economic links of a given LDC will influence its domestic
eco~omy, its expenditu re structure and its intemal political balance can
not be assumed mechanic ally from a knowledge of its trade pattern.

Exports

of sugar may strengthe n the oligarchi cal power of landlords and.finan ce
luxury consumpti on, or sustain the building of socialism .
Regardles s of uhich groups are leading and controlli ng the process of
capital accumula tion, determini ng the distribut ion of its fruits, and
the burdens of adjusting to change, a given LDC will have an interest in
internati onal economic relations which will vary depending on its incane,
populatio n and natural resources , but which in almost all cases is likely
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to be strong.and viewed as a potential source of econauic gains.

The

gains ;;ill be mainly those usually associated with the division of labor,
whether

in coouodities or technology.

During transitional or revolutionary

periods, rejections of the international link may occur, but such withdra¼al
will typically end with the establishment of a new political order.
The international link, of course, can be manipulated by the ruling
groups or classes not only to achieve broad socioeconomic goals, but also
to strengthen their omi narrow economic or political interests.

Ruling

LDC groups, for example, may be eager to welcome direct foreign investment
from a hegemonic country not for the sake of obtaining capital or techno
logy, but with the expectation that by thus tying the fortunes of those
investors to the political survival of the allied LDC groups, their power
will be strengthened by the acquisition of lobbyists within the councils
of the rich and powerful.
To avoid misunderstanding it should be stressed that the "laws of
development" obtained using data generated by postwar history and technology
will not necessarily apply to 19th or 21st Century circumstances.

But at

the very least they offer a compact and manageable summary of the hetero
geneity of the LDCs.
III.

The North:

What Hatters Most for the South

From the viewpoint of the South, the following interrelated questions·
are the most crucial regarding Northern economic characteristics.
Northern demand for Southern goods and services expanding fast?

Is the
Are the

Northern countries competitors vis-a-vis the South, or do they tend to
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present a common, cartelized front in most economic transaction s?

Are

there groups vrit) in the DCs which have specific ar..d quantit.'.ltiv ely stror.r,
0

economic intercs:s in LDCs, and are there raany or few?

If there are such

groups, are they politically powerful within the DCs, so that they exert
an itlportant influence on DC _public policy toward LDCs?
Historicall y, for a given LDC the typical answers to these questions
were not encoura 0 ing:

LDCs dealt

with DC economic groups which were few

and concentrate d, ;.;hich had the ear of th~ir respective governments and
whose well-bein 0 uere perceived to depend heavily on profits froo LDC opera
tions.

Rivalries bet\1een DC economic interests were kept down by formal or

infortial divisions of the third world, assuring each hegemonic power of its
own preserve.

DC demand for LDC products, quite dynamic before the First World

War, turned sluggish between then and the 1950s, except for petroleum.
The picture for the 1960s reveals some improvement for the LDCs,
reflecting slow-workin g historical forces.

The full presence of the USSR

in the world scene has introduced not only just one new major competitor
among the great industrializ ed powers, but also one with an ideology making
it less likely to play by the old rules of the capitalisti c game.

Further

more, with the passing of cold war confrontati on, the presence of the
USSR need not reduce competition within the capitalist camp, opening up a
potentially more fluid world scene for at least some LDCs.
While the presence of the USSR has essentially provided a security
lmlbrella for some LDCs, under which economic and political decisions have
been taken which in the old days would have led to ove-rt or covert military
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intervention by capitalistic LDCs, the postwar economic expansion of
Japan has brougl,t back into the world stage ar1 actor n.issing since around
the First World \Jar:

a rapidly growing, resource-poor, industrial archi

pela~o with a high propensity to import primary products.
The ir:;prc,;-;::d ar,d still ~xpanding economic and political expertise
of LDC policy oakers has allowed aany of these countries to take advantage
of the more favorable world circuo.stances, .to achieve not only economic
goale

but also a more effective degree of national autonomy.

Yet, the

interplay between forces toward cartelization and those for rivalry and
competition is far from settled in the North.

Evidence could be produced

for the argument that either one or the other is likely to prevail, say,
during the next ten years.

On

the cartelization side consider, for example,

trends toward Western European unity, US-USSR cooperation, concentration of
capitalistic trade and production in multinational corporations, and increasing
cross investr>lents in the securities markets.

But my o~m guess is that the

presence of a socialist camp which does not threaten militarily Western Europe
-and-Japan tips the scale in favor of a scenario of at least oligopolistic
rivalry among DC economic interests, permanently at the verge of warfare.

3

Such warfare, even assuming it remains purely economic, is not with
out some dangers for LDCs.

It could lead to a breakdo~m of prosperous,

multilateral world trade, reducing world demand for LDC products and
rekindling pressures for reviving neo-colonial "special relationships"
between subsets of DCs and LDCs.

Under those circumstances, LDCs could

suffer not only from concentrated DC economic groups using their political
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power, but also from an increase in populist DC pressures, such as those
arising from beet far:ers and textile producers in those countries.
IV.

The Choic,2 of Ar~nas of :forth-South Econonic Interaction
It is tempting to separate North-South interactions into political

and econora1ic :;p:,"re~s, the farmer being direct and the latter indirec~,
operating via different markets.
that clear cut.

The distinction, of course,· cannot be

In particular, market rules of the game, and the determina

tion of which markets are allowed to operate, are essentially political
decisions.

Power, whether military or corporate, abhors an uncontrolled

and truly competitive market.

It would be an extraordinary world in which

asyr.une~ries in military and political power were not reflected in asymnetries
in economic relations.
This seems quite straightforward, and has been at the root of "center
periphery" or dependencia schemes for a long time.

Yet, by a curious psycho

logical mechanism, similar to that which leads some to blame the victim for
a crime, even informed liberal opinion in DCs often views LDCs emphasis on
such asymmetry with ill-disguised inpatience, or with a curious eagerness
to show up minor inconsistencies in LDC arguments.
Take, as an illustration, the goal of world economic efficiency.

A pure

technocrat would know that there are several possible wa:ys of approaching
that target:

freer trade in commodities, freer international capital move

ments, or freer labor migration.

It may not be necessary, in fact, to

follow all of those policies, as trade and factor movements are all substi

tutes for each other, at least in the type of models on which efficiency policy

advice is

often

bused.

4

The obvious question is:

why not seek world

e±'Hcienc y via lccbo::- r.:o·ve:::ents instead of capital rn.o"rer:--.ents?

Or why via

sone tnJe of ca.pi tal move:,ients ( direct foreign investmen t) rather than
ot::1ers (port:::~oli o i,nrestmen t)?
Co':'!binati on

O"I.~

Why world efficienc y is sought via one

pol.:.cies (capital having the option of going to ir.nnobile

laoor), rat11er tha.'1 wi ~h other possible packages is explained less by re
ferences to 1'1althusia. "i specters than by looking at who makes the rules regard
ing which markets ar~ to operate 1 and how.
It is instructi ve to compare actual Western European treatment of
immigrant labor with the treatment some LDCs. have trie_d to impose on immi
grant capital, and which has incurred the disfavor of many economist s
worried about the inefficie ncy and "irration ality" of th9~~ rules.

A related

compariso n could have been made between US treatment of Mexican labor and
Mexican treatment of US capital.
(a)

The Calvo doctrine:

Consider the follouing aspects:

It is taken for granted that Turks working in

Germany will be subject to German laws and that th~ Turkish governmen t will
act at most as a

friend in court

if one of its nationals gets in trouble

while in Germany. The Calvo doctrine applies :f'ull.y here and no one has pro
I
posed1 as far

~

I know, special internati onal arbitra.ti on tribunals to

settle disputes between

guest workers

and host nations, as in the case of

guest capital.
(b)

Fade-out rules:

Most ~-!estem European countries appear to encour-

age guest workers to go back home after a few years.
are led to believe they can stay forever.
(c)

Few incaning workers

Rotation has been a key word.

Discrimin ation between nationals and foreigner s:

A few European

liberals have proposed the principle of non-discr imination between nationals
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and foreig ners (expec ted in the case of capita l), in such things
as
social and job secur ity, access to housin ~, etc.
not in law, the treat:: !ent is discri tinato ry.

But in practi ce, when

While during recess ions in

LDCs foreig n invest ors are more likely than d0t:1es tic entrep reneur
s to have
access to credit , guest .;orke rs are typica lly the first to feel
the
burden of slack denand in Europe . 5
(d)

Discri minati on anong foreig ners accord ing to nation ality:

This

is a practi ce frowne d upon when LDCs use it in the case of guest
capi
talist s.

Both de facto and de jure

Europe an count ries discri minat e not

only betwee n worke rs from inside and outsid e the Europe an Econom
ic Com
munity , but.al so among those from outsid e count ries.
(e)

Consu ltation regard ing the framin g and the changi ng of regula
tions:

Guest capita lists, and often their source countr y govern ment,
will howl
if new rules are sprung on them by host govern ments witho ut
previo us dis
cussio ns.

The Europe an commu nity commi ssion recen tly held a confer ence

on migra nt worke rs attend ed by close to 900 exper ts, admin istrato
rs and
union leader s.

"Perha ps sympt omatic ally, there were almos t no repres enta-

•
tives
. ant wor k ers ' organ.izatio
t here f rom t h emigr
· ns t h emse 1ves. 116

Even the limite d Europe an effort at remov ing imper fectio ns in
the
world labor marke t seems to be runnin g into seriou s diffic ulties
.

Socio logi

cal reason s are being broug ht forth to explai n why too high
a presen ce of
guest worke rs

leads to diffic ulties .

·l'hresh olds of tolera nce

beyond which

the presen ce of foreig ners becom es unacc eptabl e to the local
popul ation are
increa singly being referr ed to.

Ugly incide nts such as the rash of murde rs

of Algeri ans in Marse illes (or the murde rs of
are part of the price of going beyond the

u.s.

execu tives in Argen tina?)

thresh olds.
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T:~e _point of the nrevious discussion is ooviously

~

to suce;est th2.t

free inte:rn?.tional ::i.igation is the optir:-.al path to worldwid.e factor :price
equalization.

'.i'i1e purpose has been to highlight the fact that what markets

are allowed to operate more or less freely and/or which inperfections re
ceive nost attention by both journalists and mainstream social scientists in
the rich cormtries are neither rc.nc.0:1 nor selected by purely technocratic

criteria.

In a similar vein, the asymmetrical handling by DCs of different

types of capital outflow could be explored; while most subsidize their DFI
via insurance schemes and tax policies, they haraper free foreign access
to their capital markets.

In a very imperfect ~orld, the choice of

imperfections ,to decry and tackle is a matter of subjective judgment,
often justified on grounds of common sense or "realism." But. let us try
to be clear as to what usually determines "realism" and whose common sense
we are talking about.

7

Furthermore, the point .of the previous discussion is not to argue
that the asymmetries in the international economic order will inevitably
. lead to losses for LDCs; the argument implied that whether or not they
gain, or how much they gain, and how m~ch of the bµrdens of adjustment they
are likely to bear, has been a secondary importance to those responsible
for setting or changing the rules of the game.
V.

The Path Toward One World:

A Digression

Before taking a closer look at markets for commodities and factors of
production, sane discussion is necessary on the different perceptions by
North and South of concepts of "nationalism" and "internationalism" or
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"coS!:!opolitanisn."

'l'hose perceptions influence attitudes tm:ard ·which

mechanisns of interdepencence si10uld be used ar:.on~ states and toward
which markets should be eophasized as arenas of interaction between North
and South.

Those attitudes are also manipulated by vested interests to

obtain the1r o,-m private ends.
Put briefly, in the North nationalism evokes Hitler, Mussolini, pre-

1959 Franco, Enoch Powell and George Wallace.

At best, it evokes Gaullist

France, although judging from the often outrageous US and UK press treatmer,t
of General De Gaulle and his successors, the difference between French
nationalism and the others may be perceived as slight.

In the Soucn, coStaopol-

itanism evokes memories of distant foreign Kings or Queens or company
president:1 with different skin
. colors, different tongues (or .at least
different accents) and different cultures.

In the North, nationalism was

misused not long ago to suppress human dignity, rights of self-determination
and cultural heterogeneity.

The flag of cosmopolitanism has been used in

the South for the same purposes.

If patriotism is the last refuge of the

scoundrel, cosmopolitanism is the favorite fig leaf of the imperialist.
Before going further, it should be borne in mind that, as in the case
of economic conditions, Southern nationalisms are quite heterogeneous. }lost
LDCs (and DCs) are multiethnic or multiculture states.

8

In some areas, such

as Latin America,.loyalty to the state overlaps fairly closely with loyalty
to the national culture or ethnic group, broadly defined or perceived, while
in others, such as in many new African states, strong tensions are likely to
remain between different ethnic "nati·ons" or cultural groups brought to
gether under the same state.

Without denying the importance of those ·
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tensions, and related lm1r;uar,e prob lens, such as those in India,· in this paper
we t-1ill be concerned prio.arily uith the type of LDC nationalisr.1 ;,ri1ich rallies
loyalty to the ntate as a mechanism to defend the culturc(s) and self-respect
of LJC peoples, against wittinB or unwitting encroachnents originating in DCs.
Its primarily defensive. nature is the key characteristic of this type
of LDC nationalism.

It is not a matter of promoting loyalty to one's state

to suppress other countries. or to brag about being "number one."
a matter of protJ.oting cultural survival and self-respect.

It is

While aggressive,,

nationalism, historically found mainly in DCs, finds a need to create
myths about the intrinsic inferiority of other states and nations that it
seeks to dominate, defensive nationalism may at worst prcmote a general
mistrust of foreigners. a feeling likely to remain vague and pacific so
long as the foreigners do not come into ·one's own turf trying to dominate.
Hegemonic powers will tend to cloak their nationalism with claims
to be promoting internationalis ms; in Orwellian fashion they argue that
promoting their independence, say of imported oil, will really lead to world•
interdependenc e, or will say that proletarian internationalis m calls for
putting down proletarians with foreign tanks.

They often will justify

their own nationalistic actions as being taken only after the rest of the
-·~orld has selfishly and foolishly rejected benevolent hegemonic leaderships;
this is the "Noble Siegfried syndrome."

The rhetorical excesses of LDC

defensive nationalism typically do not include these mental contortions.
Clearly, neither nationalism nor internationalis m can be judsed as good
or bad independently of historical circumstances.
nationalism will justify it as an end in itself.

Few defenders of LDC
llmnanity, one hopes,
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moves t0t1ard · beconin; oae nation, but premature cosmopolitanism imposed
by hc£_;e:::onic pc~,-crs cd.'.1 be as negative for the march toward that goal as
anachronistic tribalis::i..

~1y hypothesis is that the optimal path for the

South, in route to true intcrnationalisn, should take it through national
self-assertion and d~fensive nationalism.
circumstances, li~e

Even under extremely favorable

the case of Puerto Rico, jumping stages (particularly

by passive choice) yields ambiguous social and psychological results.

Ideologists for multinational empires of all times have sung the benefits
to peace and to the economy of suppressing national particularisms, exceptin3
of course those of the hegeI:1onic power.

The long run results of such Augustean

ages and short-cuts to one world have been so far most unimpressive.
Even within the South, of course, the mystique surrounding the state
can be misused.

A dominant class, ethnic or cultural group vithin an LDC can

turn that powerful potential engine of growth and integration toward buttressing
its own power, or suppressing weaker ethnic or cultural gro.ups.

But it

would be a mistake to think that nationalism is just the creation of a
dominant class or an elite to maintain its power; it goes deeper than that,
particularly in states fairly homogenous culturally or ethnically.

An-

other possible retrogressive use of nationalism in the third world involves
opposition to regional integration schemes which are potentially favorable
for both economic and political reasons in areas without deep ethnic or
cultural cleavaees.

Under those circunstances, some LDC nationalisms can

also become anachronistic, and a barrier in the path toward a more efficent defensive nationalisn, structured around a larger political unit.
But it is not inconceivable that larg2LDCs nay try imposing regional.
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hegemonies mostly for their own profit, provoking defensive (and healthy)
.
nationalistic reaction~ from other LDCs against
sueh

II

•
1·
pre.aature regiona
is:-:i. II

Finally, LDC nationalisns could be nanipulated by the North to decrease
Third World solidarity.
The subject matter is ambiguous and cannot be settled a priori and,
in general, independently of specific circumstances.

Put simply, the

abtive discussion suggests that nationalisms.should be judged by their pro
mised or realized fruits.

In the South, they have eno:rI11ous potential for

raising living standards as well as human dignity and self-respect.

That

such an instrument can be misused iR no ar~ment for. thrm-ri.nc· it amiy.
Particularly while those historically in the position of leading the way
toward the fadinB away of nationalims, the DCs, shm<T no sign of doing so.
The ambiguities surrounding the issue of nationalism may explain the
wildly different responses evoked, even among scholars, by different his
torical attempts at "nation building."

Contrast, for example, attitudes

toward the struggles led by Attaturk and those l~d by Isabel and Ferdinand
The same observers who are appalled by language riots in India, or tribal
clashes in Africa, will often sympathize with the actions of separatist
Basques, Ukranians and Puerto Ricans.

And more than one nationalistic

intellectual has been taught the value of transnational alliances by a
tyrant in his homeland.
One last word on this messy subject.

History, especially colonial

history, has left us:with a crazy-quilt of states and arbitrary boundaries
(just look at a political map of the Caribbean!).

But·one must be sus

picious of possible uses of ad hoc arguments pointing to the irrationality
<

- - -
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of having a few tho-.is~,--.,.i citizcr-.s of c<Y.mtry :~ or Y controllir..g high
percentages of this or that .-.'orlcl resource.

The suspicion is strengthene d

by the realization ti,at the DCs • where one often hears that argtnnent, in
the past often deliberatel y helped to create such small or sparsely popu
lated countries. with the excuse of promoting national self-expres sion.
Exanples include US involv~~ent in the creation of the Republic of Panana,
and British policy in the Persian Gulf.

Note that even today the British

cla:im to defend the rights of self-expres sion of the handful of people on
Gibraltar, placed there by the British in the first place. against Spanish
claims.

Furthermore , having a small percentage of t~e world's population
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controllinz a huge share of the production of a given resource does not
appear, prL~a facie, more shocking than similar calculations for consumption
of the saoe resources.

Eventually the world cor.lr.lunity may handle both

matters more equitably and rationally; right now the discovery by some in
the DCs of the irrationality of existing LDC states and boundaries must
be regarded with skepticism and_concern.
If the primacy and persistence of desires for national self-determina
tion are granted, we should seek arenas of North-South economic interaction
compatible both with LDC goals of greater autonomy, and economic advantage
for all participants.

Economists have traditionally viewed competitive

markets as theoretically capable and reconciling individual freedom with
an efficient and interdependent social division of labor.

We now turn to

examine whether this vision is relevant for contemporary North-South
economic relations.

In particular, we will want to ask the following

questions of actual or potential international markets, besides the
traditional ones about their efficiency and competitiveness:
(a)

Can transactions be carried out at "arm •·s-length"?

How much

will those international economic links intrude into the national social
and political life of participants?

In short, can arenas for standoffish

arrangements be created?.
(b)

Can international markets provide the goods and services desired

by LDCs in separate compartments, or in packages which can be decomposed

if the buyer wants_a part of them, but not others?

Can the LDCs abstain

fran participating in some international markets, without impairing their
chances of becoraing effective buyers or sellers in other international markets?
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(c)

CJ;1 i:1 t.e:::uational narkets provide contracts which have clear

ter.::ination dates, or ,:hich have l;uilt-in renegotiating provisions?
In general, of course, the unintrusiveness, deconposibility and re
versibility of ca:u:-£rcial arrangements will be interrelated.

On

t11e

whole, the narc conpctitive an international market, the raore likely it
is that it will have these desirable characteristics.
VI.

.

Co1.;._'7odity (Silent?) Trade
Surveying the world trade scene in 1973, it appears that both LDCs
I

and DCs have ~uch to gain from the maintenance and expansion of commodity
trade.

It also seetis that such trade could be carried out in the future

in a manner which allows each community a plentiful amount of control
over its own economy and society.

It can have some of the quality of

unintrusiveness anthropologists find in the "silent trade" undertaken
between primitive tribes.
That LDCs, particularly the smaller LDCs, niay gain a good deal by
active participation in international cotmnodity trade would seem to be
another obvious proposition, to be taken for granted.

Yet it still meets

with considerable resistance, perhaps because the proposition in the past
was framed in terms of the inevitability of gains fran trade to everybody.
There was also, and there still is, a good deal of misplaced concreteness
attributing to commodities intrinsically desirable or undesirable quali
ties, e.g., sugar and coffee are bad, butter and steel are good.

While

such views have some use in understanding the economic history of countries
with weak central governments, they are far less useful for many conteo.porary
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LDCs \·.'fliCh have a respectable array of policy tools ui:;able to correct
distortions

and defoma.tions ,-:hich coul<l arise from staple exports.

t,ote

that a recent slogan of the Cuban revolutionary government is: "Sugar for
Growth."

The historical link bet\:cen exports of pritiary products, open

eco:10::.ies .ind landlord-dc::iinated renressive govern..1ents can still be seen
in several LDCs,

and

in sane countries it t:iay have been strengthened by

the 1972-73 coc~odity boom, but there are now enough counter-examples to
show that such link is no iron-law.
Iloth LUC export pessimists. and those in DCs which delight in con
vincing poor countries of their alleged econanic impotence, not long
ago used to argue that imports from LDCs were of marginal :iI:lportance to
the rich, and their purchase was presented almost as an act of DC
altruism.

Altruism, of course, which could be terminated if LDCs were

naughty; witness the el:inination of imports of Cuban sugar into the US
during the early 1960s and the boycott of Iranian oil in the 1950s.

Hypotheses

regarding the importance of cheap raw materials and primary products from
the South for the prosperity of the North were brushed aside during the late
1950s and 1960s by pointing to small percentages of those imports in gross na
tional product.
naive:

Arguments about supply reliability were also deemed mistaken or

it was all a matter of price, it was noted.

Only frantic radicals

or third-world types could be expected to take seriously the notion that
Northern foreign policies had anything at all to do with assuring those
countries with cheap and reliable supplies of primary products from the
South.

Events in commodity markets during 1972 and 1973, particularly the
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oil situation, have shaken those DC perceptions.

Indeed, anong some

DC observers attitudes on these matters have gone from indifference or
coritc::1pt ·to a somewhat paranoid hysteria.
The discussion of conmodity trade so far has a decidedly old
fashioned flavor; nothir,3 has been said of trade in manufactured 3oods,
billed often as the new breakthrough in LDC exports.

For some LDCs, main

ly those with a poor natural resource endot-ment, those exports no doubt
offer hope to break out of severe foreign exchange limitations.

But it

seems far from inevitable or desirable that successful development for
all LDCs must be characterized by a sharp increase in the share of manu
factures in their export bill.

Many can expect to follow a path similar

to that of Australia, Denmark or New Zealand, a path in which_growing
industrialization of productive structure need not be accompanied by a
corresponding change in the export bill structure.
From several vieupoints, those LDCs may be regarded as the lucky
ones.

The luck, in the first place, is in their endowment of natural

resources, producing export values which typically include large pure
rents, i.e., those exports have low danestic resource costs.

One could,

of course, have too much of a good thing, if in the very long run ex
cessive rents lead to a flabby society, unable to adapt to new circumstances when the rent-yielding resources become exhausted.

Secondly,

and regardless of what happened in earlier historical periods, internation
al markets in 1973 for primary products are often more standoffish than
those for the new manufactured exports.

Placing soybeans, cotton or

copper in interna tional markets will involve less depende nt relation ships with foreigne rs than trying to sell interna tionally Ford engines ,
parts of Olivett i typet.rri ters or bits and pieces of electron ic equipme nt.
The differen ce is negligib le when the compari son is made with steel, cenent
or flat glass, but exceptin g textiles not much of the celebrat ed increase in
LDC manufac tured exports seem to be in the category of standard ized finished
industr ial goods, sold in open competi tive oarkets . Put differen tly, LDC
compara tive disadvan tage in interna tional marketin g is less of a problem with
primary products than with many c1anufac tured exports .

Finally,_ there has been

a remarka ble trend, which may be deemed basical ly irrevers ible, toward LDC
control over the exploita tion and marketin g of those natural resourc es.

Such

control , inciden tally, may result in more corapeti tive world markets in com
moditie s using _those resource s as inputs, as LDC nationa lization s have dimin
ished the oligopo listic power of several vertica lly integrat ed compani es.
For many LDCs, particip ation of private and public nationa l-entrep reneurs is
greater in primary product exports than in those of manufac tures.
The depende nce associat ed with exports of many types of manufac tured
goods would natural ly increase if they were to occur only thanks to
tariff preferen ces granted by DCs to favorite LDCs.

Under those circum

stances , it is not difficu lt to foresee that the major LDC exports benefit 
ting from such schemes will be those produce d by firms owned by citizens
of those Uorther n countrie s granting special trade preferen ces.

A case

can still be made for generali zed and uncondi tional DC preferen ces granted
to all LDCs, but the likely benefits to LDCs from politica lly feasible
schemes of that sort appear out of proport ion to the attentio n they have
received during the last ten years.
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From all that has been said so far, it should be clear that commodity
trade under steady ~ultila teral rules of the game, and in open and
competi tive markets , is a possible arena of economi c interact ion between
LOC~ ;mrl flCc, offeri.n~ arr::m~c:-:cnts which are econooi cally efficien t Fhile
maintain in~ desirab le charact eristics of unintru sivenes s, reversi bility and
deco111p osibility.

Histori cally, such arena has not existed .

lforthem

countrie s first develope d their LDC sources of prit:lary products
W1der colonia l or neo-col onial circums tances, and through out have mani
pulated rules of the cane in internat ional com111odity markets mostly to
suit

their own ends, not hesitati ng to change then as their own con

venience dictated .

Protecti on to Northern farmers has taken preceden ce

during peacetim e over commitm ents to trade liberali zation.
The most recent exanple of asymme trical DC attitude s toward interna tional commodity r.iarkets is the outcry regardin g "freedom of access" to rmJ materia
ls

and alleged "carteli zation" by LDCs.

During 1953-70 , when commodity prices were

low or tending to fall, DCs argued that interna tional commodity uarkets
wrked best when left alone, includin g those which even then gave evidenc e
of being either fragmen ted or far from competi tive (diamon ds and oil under
the ancien regime of the seven sisters ).

On

the-oth er hand, since at

least the Second World Har, LDCs have argued the case for commodity agreeme nts
which would avoid price instabi lity.

At first sight, it would appear that

this is the right time to resurrec t plans for general ized stabiliz ation of
commodity markets , giving DCs security about "access on equal terns to the
trade and to the raw materia ls of the .world," as put by the Atlantic Charter ,

in exchange for assuring LDCs of reliable markets at predictab le prices. 9
The case for a world-wid e "ever-nor mal granary" has been strengthe ned
by the 1973 inflation ary pressures , which have baffled the most learned
macroecon omists of the industria lized world.

In retrospec t, and on the

basis of a nee-struc turalist view of inflation , it can be argued that
one of the benefits obtained by the industria lized countries from low or
falling LDC export prices during 1953-70, coupled to the reserves generated
by US

agricultu re, was a relativel y stable price level.

More than a

few DC observers are putting their hope for an end of the present inflation ary
burst on a collapse of primary product prices from their 1972-73 levels.
It should not be beyond the wits of a rational world community to devise
generaliz ed commodity agreement s which, without interferin g with long-run
price trends, smooth out violent price fluctuatio ns which can trigger
inflation ary spirals, and provide

stocks against natural calamitie s.

Failures of past sporadic commodity agreement s could be blamed on lack of
political will among participa nts and on technical weaknesse s as much as
on intrinsic failings of such arrangem ents.
It should be noted that even at the purely technical level, it is not
clear that a competiti ve market will generate efficient results for the
case of exhaustib le natural resources .

In an uncertain world, lacking a

full set of futures and insurance markets, the market mechanism can become
an

unreliabl e means of pricing and allocatin g those resources , generatin g

myopic decisions and considera ble price instabili ty. 10
So which mechanism is more desiraple in the COllllllodity area:
markets or imperfect canmodity agreemen ts?

imperfect

Given the mediw-te rm outlook
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of demand for LDC commodities, which even discounting the excesses of the
1972/73 commodity boom is reasonably good, I end up leaning toward the
former.

Unequal LDC bargaining power and interests would make generalized

commodity agreements difficult to negotiate, and would present Northern
countries rich opportunities to "divide and rule."

Outside a few possible

special cases, such as oil or copper, LDC bargaining pouer could best be
employed in broadening and improving existing international t.1arkets; DC com
mitments regarding freedom of access to their markets and a gradual end of
their protectionism must be the necessary price for their gaining freedom
of access to LDC supplies.

In some commodity markets, greater use can

be made of long-term contracts, as substitutes for missing futures markets.
More thought could also be given to improving the latter.

Fear of los

ing access to raw materials has led some DC observers to dream of reviving
"special relationships" with selected LDCs; on balance, LDCs have much to
gain from multilateral markets free of nee-colonial overtones.
Physical control over a good share of the earth's land surface and
subsoil remains the big LDC asset.

Notable improvements in LDC political

and economic management, plus favorable world market conditions, put
many of these countries in circumstances unmatched in their contemporary
history, particularly for taking advantage of export growth for local
11
development.
VII.

Service Transactions
International service markets and transactions, and the characteristics

of participants in them, are more hete_rogeneous than those for commodities.
Some are quite standardized, and involve many buyers and sellers dealin·g at
arm's length.

Shipping services not controlled by "conferences" approach
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such descrip tion.

Other service market s ~ay be quite compe titive, but

their geogra pilical dc::iain oay be such as to produce interac tions between
.
12
DC and LDC citizen s ~:hich are not always satisfa ctory, sue h as toun.sm
.
A third type of service market , that of techno logy, or more genera lly
non-aca demic knowle d 0 e, has recentl y receive d a consid er able a:::1oun t of
attenti on. 13 The charac teristi cs of the genera tion of technol ogy or
com
mercia l knowle dge, and of the produc t itself, are typica lly such as to
make these market s, particu larly those involvi ng DCs and LDCs, far from
purely compet itive ones.
The market power of DC sellers of technol ogy is buttres sed institu 
tionall y by the Paris Conven tion on patent s, and by packag ing practic
es
of multin ational corpor ations (MNCs), on which more will be said below.
The recent upsurg e of intere st in the econom ics and politic s of technol
ogy
market s has not yet offset accumu lated dismal ignoran ce regardi ng their
mechan isms.

Nevert heless, LDC intere st in this area appear s fully justifi ed.

It is not obviou s, for exampl e, that LDCs benefi t from the Paris Conven
tion,
and a plausib le case can be made for the withdr awal of those LDCs which
are
now signat aries.

The diffic ult balance between incent ives to genera te new

knowled ge and the efficie nt dissem ination of existin g knowle dge appears
at
presen t overly tilted in favor of the former.
Howeve r, nation al rather than interna tional action should take clear
priorit y in this area.

The "knowl edge needed to buy knowle dge" must be

built up by the LDCs as-a first step, perhaps in region al associ ations.
Region al develop ment banks, and the Intern ationa l Bank for Recons tructio
n
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2.r.d :Jevelopr::.ent (I:Li?J) > cc"..ild nelp :r::uc'.': ~ore t:ta.>i in the past (t:ie reccrd.

here is quite ue.ci), but ir. ccr.tr:,,s:, ,tith t~:e cor..- :ioclit:· area, 2.r~d si::ularl:·

to the field of fine.nee, ttere is a d::-~'1ger that expansion of internatio!'l.al
nar~ets and cha..'1nels of inter::iediation nay weaken indispensable local
:::arl:ets and insti tut ions. The cruel asymmetry in "knowledge about knowledge" between LDC
buyers and DC sellers must be corrected by f'irst building up LDC-controlled
expertise and inst,itutions in this area.

By now the pool of LDC experts in

various fields is most impr~ssive, but due to a lack of indigenous institutions
their work within LDCs is often channelled via foreien or international
organizations.

It is not unusual, for exa-:::ple, to have a DC consultant finn

obtain a contract in an LDC to be carried out to a large extent by experts
hired by that finn within the same (or in other) LDCs.
Once emphasis is given to developing local expertise and institutions,
LDCs would be in a better position to press for refonn of international
markets in technolog;y, in some cases

using their increased bargaining

power in commodity markets for that purpose, as some oil exportine LDCs
have attempted recently.
Finally, it could be noted that public enterprises of socialist countries,
at least in some fields, could play an important role in increasing the
flexibility of international technological markets, as presumably they are
not as bound by fears of competition used to justify the technological
secrecy of developed capitalistic finns.
has been timid.

But so far their participation
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VIII.

I:,te:ri,2.tior:~l '.farkets for Labor and Capital
[npla:me<l intern,-:itional narke ts for unskilled labor are t~ pically
1

characterized by a sharp division betHeen those who in the host country
reap the fruits froo. a labor inflow, and those who bear the adjustment
costs to such an inflow.

Th~ gains are often quickly reaped, while the

adjustment costs are dr&wn out and may carry to future generations.

This

explains uass resistance in most DCs to large labor inflows from LOCs.
The ugly racism in which such resistance often expresses itself should
not obscure the fact that unplanned international labor flows, such as
those in Europe, even when benefitting LDC nationals and DC capitalists,
are also an example of premature cosmopolitanism , difficult to generalize
q1assively in today's world.

Note that within the South such flows also gen-

erate friction; witness the status of Colombian workers in Venezuela and
that of Paraguayans in Argentina.
While international markets for unskilled labor are limited and imperfect, the market for skilled labor or human capital has undergone
considerable internationaliz ation since World War II.

Two-way flows have

been established between North and South, often via the intermediation
of international organizations.

Leaving aside those flows from DCs to LDCs

which are explicitly subsidized, the question has been raised as to whether
the counter flow from LDCs to DCs, which occurs overwhelmingly as an ostensibly
commercial transaction, does not contain a perverse subsidization and resource
transfer from the South to the North.

A high degree of canpetitiveness

in that market is not in doubt; the issue centers on ~he appropriabilitv of
returns on public investment in education, possible externalities of human
capital in LDCs, and the manipulation of markets by DCs using asymmetrical
treatment for different types of labor inflows.
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Opti::i.al natio nal and inter natio nal poli cies
in this area , on both econ omic and poli tica l [;rou nds, are like ly to exclu
de both laiss ez-f aire and abso lute
bans on migr ation . The nunb ers invo lved in
thes e flm,s are soal l rela tive to
tota l popu latio ns, and shou ld not gene rate the
frict ions asso ciate d with cass
uizra t:ton s of uns:- :.illed labo r to alrea dy settl
ed area s. Tax schem es, invol vinr. ;
both host and hor.1e coun tries , and known ex-a
nte to all conc erned , coul d reco ncile
the legi tina te claim s of home coun tries for
retu rns on thei r publ ic inve stment in educ ation and indiv idua l desi re for
mob ility . Whet her such
taxe s are levie d at the tine of exit

or are sprea d out throu gh tir.ie is

a matt er whic h coul d be settl ed on prac tical
grou nds, with the latte r
poss ibili ty gain ing appe al from impe rfect ions
of capi tal mark ets in an
unce rtain worl d. If inte rnat iona l taxa tion
trea ties have been work ed out
for phys ical capi tal, simi lar ones shou ld not
be too diff icul t to esta b. hf or hum.an cap. ita.
1 is
1 14
The read er will not be surp rised if unco ntro
lled dire ct fore ign
inve stme nt carr ied out by larg e MNCs owned by
DC: nati onal s, part icula r~y
thos e fron hege ooni c powe rs, is rega rded in
this pape r as the majo r
exam ple of prem ature and misg uided cos~ opol
itani sm, havi ng most of the
unde sirab le char acte risti cs discu ssed for aren
as of LDC-DC econ omic tran sactio n. This i's not the plac e to sUlllI:J.arize
the vast liter atur e of HHCs;
a few rema rks on the subj ect shou ld be suff
icie nt.
The rela tion ship s betw een larg e MNCs and host
LDC gove rnme nts and
rulin g grou ps, unle ss clos ely cont rolle d and
watc hed, are unli kely to be
stan doff ish in the sens e of keep ing at a reaso
nabl e and dece nt dista nce
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econooic from political decisions.

It can be plausibly argued that the

sa1:1e can be said re!;arcling the relationships between lEiCs and DC 3ovcrn
mcnts aud n:lin3 ;;roups.

But given the greater frailty of LDC govern-

ments and societies, an even ~reater concern is warranted.

Compare, for

exar.n_1le, the Op".")ortu.,ities for ITT nischief uhen dealing with the US vs.
the Chilean or Ecu;:u.orean governments.
It is well knmm that tGCs provide a package of services, difficult
to untangle and cost separately.

The package often can be said to

include particular links to the international cot:llllunity, such as participa
tion in the Paris Convention,

when a host country is too weak to reject

this fashion of signalling its commitment to a favorable investment
climate.

Local production of some comnodities by UNCs can also limit a

host country's export potential and even its-.foreign policy.

During

1973 and early 1974, for example, there were reports that G.H.
Argentina, Ford Argentina and Goodyear Argentina were waiting for US
permission regarding possible industrial exports to Cuba, financed by
supplier credits from the Argentine government. 15 ·
Unless a host country makes a special and often jerky effort,
involvements with HNCs are difficult to reverse.

Note the

difficulties wh•ich even well-behaved Canada has had to go through to buy
back (at rather handsome prices) an interest in Texasgulf, Inc.

Clearly,

a marriage so difficult and painful to break up should be entered into
only with the greatest of circumspection.

The R0r1anian publication of

its detailed ''marriage" contract with Control Data, said to include 29

I
I

I·
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appendices, in its official gazette, is an exdl:lple which LDCs should
consider follo,..:ing.

16

Whenever possible, of course, such LDC actions

should be &dopted under conraon rules, to expand their bargaining leverage,
in the spirit of the Andean group.
The tendency of d21Cs to interact negatively with LDC m'arket imper
fections and to replace both national and internation al markets for inter
nal corporate planning explains uhy some market-orie nted economists
exµress serious reservation s about their role in LDCs.

Consider the follow

ing two statements, one by Hla Hyint and the other by Ronald HcKinnon:
"But it may be wondered whether, instead of their current policies of
protection and selective admittance of foreign manufacturi ng industry,
they [the LDCs] might not find a more promising 'second-bes t' _policy in
1117
combining restriction s on all foreign enterprises with free trade.
"Correspond ingly, the bootstrap theory here implies that reliance on
foreign direct investment- -with its package of finance, modern technology,
and managerial skills--sho uld be curtailed by LDCs themselves in order to
18
.
promote balanced indigenous developmen t."
That DFI carried out by large NNCs, particularl y those with head
quarters in hegemonic powers, often tend to replace markets and have a
number of undesirable political and social effects, does not rule out the
possibility that such agents frequently will turn out to be economicall y
more efficient than the uncontrolle d markets they replace.

Centralized

planning, either public ·or corporate, may improve on uncontrolle d market
perforr.iance , both theoretical ly and in- practice.

Indeed, some popular
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criticisDs of ~GlCs in the :lorth rel.:1te not to their nonopolizin~ ten
dencies, but to t:1.:2 burdens of E",cljustin3 to ~GC actions ,,:1ich essentially
reproduce i,;;1at co~:_;ctitive narkets would yield, but more brusquely and
perhaps faster, as in the case of transferring labor-intensive uroduction
fro."'.1 hi 0 h to lou-uage areas.
It should also be noted that even if the DFI package could be totally
untangled, aany LDCs uill still prefer at least sane a1aount of pack.asing,
preferably in the for.n of joint ventures, as a way of insuring continuous
access to the on-r,oin~ technolocical resenrch of foreign conpanies.

Such

deals will be healthier, however, when chosen over other options, especi
ally the one of total unpackaging, as contrasted with their reluctant
acceptance as the only possible way to obtain technology and capital.
There is, of course, no economic reason why international capital
movements should occur solely or primarily via ~mes.
depression of the 193Os, large sums

Before the great

were transferred from DCs to. LDCs

using debt instruments via capital markets which were no models of perfect
competition, but which allowed greater flexibility, in many respects,
than direct foreign investment.

Technology, on the other hand, was

transferred massively and largely independently of those capital flows.
Influenced by the unfortunate experience of the 193Os, Anglo-Saxon
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planners sou8ht to replace those narkets in the post World Har II new
ordc::r partly by institutions such as the IBRD, for lone-term capital, and
the International ~'.0.1.etary Fund (~fF), for short tern capital.

The

~r.1Cs also stepped into the void, beconin3 not only investors of their own
funds, but also acting as financial interraediaries, borrmdng in DCs and
in LDCs to invest within LDCs. ·
Hany DCs emerged fro1,1 the 1930s and the second world war with formal
and informal regulations limiting foreign access to their national capital
markets.

Hot surprisingly, and until very recently, international capital

markets worthy of that name remained thin and lethargic, shackled by re
strictions and dominated by the competition from MNCs, the IBRD and the
IMF.

The remarkable upsurge during 1972/73 of LDC mediut1-term borrowing
in the unregulated Eurodollar market, so far mostly in the form of bank
loans, could signal a revival of the use of international markets to
transfer capital from DCs to LDCs, as well as their use of interoediaries
for capital flows within the LDC group.

Without underestimating the

danger that international capital markets could show increasing carteliza
tion, nor that their expansion could jeopardize the development of those
within LDCs, it nevertheless appears that transactions in the Eurodollar
market between DC private institutions and LDC borrmvers show characteris
tics of unintrusiveness, decomposibility and reversibility to a much greater
extent than those involving HNCs.

The list of borrowers include countries

such as Algeria, Cuba, Hungary, Peru and Yugoslavia, which have not been
favorites of HNCs.

The Peruvian example may be particul3'lY significant,

as much of that country's borrowing took place while the t-Iorld Bank,
the Inter-Aoerican Development Bank, and of course AID, engafced in an
informal financial blockade, following Peruvian nationalization of so~e
direct foreign investnents.
It is siQiif:.cr:..':.t tr,::i.t t:-.is trend rrns not r.:et with universal acclai;1.

'i:nis })a!°tly reflect.s

"l.

leci ti:-ia.te concern for the fragility of t:1e Euro

dollar narket and for t::e danbers of excessive borrowing by LDCs.

But one

also detects in some of the ·worried commentary a touch of the fear of the
intemediarJ who is being cut out
control and power.

I

and of the bureaucrat who is losing

Others actually prefer a tied package to markets pro

viding each component reparately. Some of these attitudes may be reflected
in the following quotes from:..a recent speech by Williams. Gaud, executive
vice president of the International Finance Corporation:
"Nevertheless , I see very real risks for the developing countries in
borrowing so heavily in a market with no established lending standards and
no overall surveillance to prevent tmsound practices. • •

There is IDother

feature of these Euro-currency loans which should not be overlooked.
Foreign private investment is important to the developing countries not only
because it contributes capital for their development but because it brings
with it technology, management, training and access to foreip,n market·s
items which are all in short supply in the Third World.
bring with them none of these.

Euro-currency loans

Indeed, they are often made even without

any appraisal of the soundness of the prqjects they are int;nded to finance. "19
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Suitably extended and reinforced, on uhich more below, a reasonably
coc,petitive international (private) narket for LDC debt can provide a
useful arena for economic interaction between DCs and many LDCs.

This

is the path of independence and a miniI:lUI!l of controls, as put by Charles
.
.
, .
. 20
P. Kind 1 eberger in his p1one~r1ng
advocacy o f tnis
t h esis.

But the

LDCs comoitted to a market econooy would do well to expand also their own
internal capital markets.

The richest ~nd.more sophisticated LDCs can

also increasingly take a bigger share of the profits from intermediation
by developing their own financial institutions, capable of operating
at the international level, particularly for flows among LDCs (and!_
fortiori for flows among nationals of the same LDC) •
IX

Concessional Finance
The two arenas singled out as particularly favorable for DC-LDC

interaction, i.e., corrmodity and debt markets, even if working well

may

leave the population of the least developed countries, devoid of nruch of
·a natural resource base and therefore not creditworthy by current com
mercial standards, in extreme poverty for the foreseeable future.

These

countries provide the strongest argument for the continuation of interna
tional concessional financial flows, which otherwise share with direct
foreign investment low grades in standoffishnes s, although doing somewhat
better in decomposibilit y, 21 and nuch better in reversibility or ability
to tenuinate the arrangement relatively smoothly.
It may be possible that international concessional finance going to
the least developed countries will include in the future the participation

-34-

of other, ttore prosperous LDCs, particularly in regions with a strong
sense of cultural solidarity, such as L.atin ,.'\nerica and the ?-!oslen nations.
Be that as it oay, aid to the least developed countries will be more success
ful when targetted to a clearly defined charitable purpose, like avoidinp,
a faraine, than ,1hen seeking more general goals, i.e., proooting develop
ment.

This, of course, will not surprise those who

have followed the

aid story_ during the last twenty years.
The orders of magnitude for concessional finance which realistically
can be e:~pec ted durin:; the foreseeable future do not warrant much discussion of this fonn of DC-LDC interaction.

Looking back, it is clear

that the attention given by academics and others to this area was out of
proportion to its actual or potential importance for development in most

.

LDCs.
The soft windows of existing multilateral institutions, such as the IBRDIDA and the regional development banks, are likely to continue limping along un
draraatically, except in the 1.n1likely case that they were to receive large and
steady funds from SDR-link scheaes, fran oil-rich stat~s, or from controlling sea
beds.

Those institutions will have to rely mainly on their usefulness as inter-

mediaries between world capital markets and LDCs which find direct access
to those markets too expensive, or which prefer, for a variety of reasons,
to place part of their debt with multilateral institutions.

The greater

variety of possible sources of finance open to the more advanced LDCs will
no

doubt put some competitive pressure on the World Bank group and on

regional development banks.

Such pressures may lead to difficult dilemmas
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for those institutions:

viewed as organizations wishing to survive and

expand or <lesirins to influence donestic LDC policies, they will want to
woo their "best custoners," such as Hexico, Nigeria, Brazil and Thailand.
But fror:i a development viewpoint, they should consider charging hieher
rates of interest to their best customers (who may then stop borrowing
from them), while passing on to the poorest countries via lower interest
rates all of the gains obtained by public raultilateral borrowing.
The influence which bilateral or multilateral aid agencies will be
able to exert on the domestic priorities of borrowing countries will
continue to wane for those LDCs with alternative borrowing possibilities.
Regardless of the good intentions of those attempting to guide LDC
priorities, or of the wisdom of whichever happens to be the fasionable
top priority at a given time among world development executives, the
experience of the last ten years suggests that such waning is mostly to
the good.

Whatever the levels of concessional bilateral or multilateral

aid which remain to be granted in the future are. they would best be
disbursed quietly and routinely, with a greater sense 9f automaticity
22
. h out too muc h invo
.
1 vement in
. oth er countries
.
' domestic
. a ff airs.
·
and wit
X.

International ;.;c,netarv Reforn
One major LDC interest in international monetary reform, narrowly

defined, is to obtain the scheme most favorable to smoothly expanding world
trade in a multilateral framework.
as well as DCs, appear to aGree.

On

this point all LDCs, la.ree and small,

One can go further and suggest that as

most LDCs are (and are likely to remain for a long t~e) net debtors, they
will benefit fron a system yielding a world a 0 grecate demand such that it
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if acconpanied b~r slack capacity utilization in tl1ose co1.U1tries, :~o·wever, is

u:1likel~· to· be acconpc..."J.:.ed.

l;y

~,;tern.:11 cin:.llr.lstar.::es which are

on balance

favorable for LDCs.
A relatively flexible excha."lge rate systen, with rules :'or crawling
or ~icelinc, ~~ong industrialized countries

and large and/or inflationary

LlJCs seens most suitable to the maintenance of full capacity use and ex:panding world trade.

It is at first sic;ht so:r.iewhat surprising that LDCs as a

group,, a group within which sMall LDCs have the r.iost votes, have supported
fixed rates for the DCs.

~he. explanation, however, seems straightforward.

Economically snall and open LDCs, small and open with respect to both trade and
finance, will usually want to maintain fixed parities vis-a-vis a major indus
trial power, for optimur.i. currency area reasons, whatever the world exchange
rate system is.

Thus, Guatemala will want to keep its currency pegged to

the U.s. dollar, Chad will wish to peg to the French franc, etc.
even large Mexico wishes to remain pegged to the

u.s.

dollar.

Hote that
Given such

a starting point, it is not surprising that those LDCs will prefer the
major currency to which they peg to remain in turn pegged to the rest of
the world, particularly when their trade, althoug.11 oriented toward one indus
trial power, hes a reasonable degree of geographic diversification.

This will

not only maxir.~ze the econonic benefits derived from opti:r.rum currency area
considerations, but it will also cloak.the unpleasant nee-colonial flavor
of being in a

dollar area,

a

franc area,

etc.

A world without an obvious
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sin8le in tern2.tional noney also presents a nur:.ber of oinor headaches for
oanasers of LDC external asset and debt portfolios.

finally, it can be

argued that as LDCs wish to expand the ar:iount of SDRs issued, even under
present rules, they will naturally oppose exchange regimes which would
reduce the need for international reserves.

23

The gross loss to snall (and not-so-small) LDCs of having the industrial
ized countries move to more flexible exchange rates, however, may be in fact
turned into a net t:;<1in when one co:::.pares that scenario not with the :p!'e-

1971 world, but with realistic alternative monetar-J arrangeY:1.ents for the
future.

A future system of pegged rates among industrial countries is

unlikely to work without severe controls over trade and capital flows, or
without a close and cozy degree of policy coordination among DCs.

Neither

prospect should be particularly attractive to LDCs, which may not escape
even under a fornall~' fixed exchange rate system the danc;ers of hegemonic
currency areas and preferential zones.

In spite of the image projected by

official declarations, this is in fact rec"~nized h~r nany LX policy-makers.
Contrar-J to some panicked cor.Jr.1entary, the LDC experience in the post-

1971 world has been, so far and on balance, quite £Ood, and manv an LDC Central
Bank has learned. that it is not so difficult to keep tabs on cross-rates or
to calculate reasonable portfolio combinations in different currencies.
While erantinc that the extraordinary 1972/73 comnodity boom has helped
adjustnent to the new order a good deal, it must also be pointed out that
forces fuelling that boom, including fiscal and monetary policies in the
North, were encouraged by the new floating policies.

It may also be noted
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that while flexible rates in major financial centers are supposed to
discou rn~e, ce te ris n.r:ib~:s, international capital flows, the post-1971
world has \.'::.tnessed a lar~:e expansion of LDC activity in those markets.
In stort, a 1:-orld tradine comuni t~· wi ti1 lo',; P.nd decreasing DC controls over co:rrz:od.it~r a.'1.d cupital :~lows, with expe..'1.dinc trade, and with
loose policy coordination a;1onc DCs is difficult to visualize without the
adoption b~• those countries of reasonably flexible exchange rates.

Such a

srster.i, while providing LDCs a potentially favorable external enviromnent,
will impose some minor adjustment costs to many of them.

A weak case could be

made for compensating them for such costs via nore favorable allocations of
Special Drawinr, Rights ( SDRs) •
On the assur1ption that IT1ajor industrial countries will consolidate a sys
tem of floating exchange rates, while most non-inflationary and small Ll)Cs will
keep fixed rates in tenns of one of the key currencies, it can be argued
that the reserve needs of the latter will be greater than those of the
fomer, relative to their shares in world trade, 24

Participation in SDR

allocations, and perhaps IHF q_uotas, could be expected· to adjust to this
new situation.

It could also be expected that

the

rules for crawling

which

may emere;e from international monetary reform will :make allowances for the
different characteristics of LDC balance of payments situations, rather

than rigidly tryin~ to aPoly the same rules to all, re2ardle~R of serious
structural differences.

For example, a net debtor can be expected to keep

a level of gross international liquid reserves different from those of a
net creditor.

LDCs exporting exhaustible natural resources may, in their

optimization plans through time, acc\.llllulate large liquid reserves in the
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near future, to be Jra'.7!1 do~•rn at a later date.

Rir;id rules built around

reserve levels, or even chan~es in levels, would ne~lect those special
circumstances.

A tactical decision for I..DCs as a group has been whether to seek to
bran.den nc£otiations for a new international ooneta.ry order· into a more
general discussion of international econonic reform, in the spirit of

1944, and if so, on which related issues to concentrate their bargaining
power.

So far, the LDCs have chosen to emphasize plans for a link betveen

SDR creation and a favorable allocation to LDCs.
into serious opposition.

Such proposals have run

At bottom, the non-academic opponents are unwilling

to yield DC political control over the grant element which would be involved in
link schemes.

At the same tir::ie, however, and r.iainly for tech~ical reasons,

the idea that SDRs should bear an interest rate not too far below those
rulin:e in the_ world markets for prine short term paper has eained eround.
This implies that net users of SDRs would gain less net real resources even
from favorable allocations.

The use of SDRs would then become

an a.ttracti ve

fom of borrowing for LDCs, particularly to those with weak international
credit standing, but not

~

different from. other foms of borrowing.

It may well be that a reallocation of I:lF quotas and SDR allocations,
justified primarily by ceneralized floating by industrial countri.es plus
widespread pegging by LDCs, and the recognition of special LDCs balance of
payments problems, with greater quotas and SDR allo~~tions going to the
LDCs, is all that can

be expected

at the moment.

This, of course, could

be made to yield some net gains.to LDCs as a group.

-40-

There arc other issues of international econor.iic reform uhere LDC
bargainin~ pm-~cr could be fruitfu::.ly applied under present circumstances.
Reduction of DC protection for ccn~o<lities of srecial LDC export interest,
and the reuoval of DC practices restricting the diffusion of technolocical
knm.rledge have been already nentioned as candide1tes for discussion.
An important area which has been ner,lected so far in international

monetary discussions is the establishment of liberal and clear rules
guaranteeins LDC access to the national capital markets of industrialized
nations.

This may be partly explained by the boom in LDC borrowing in the

international Eurodollar market.

But the lesson from that experience is

then not being correctly learned.

Such boom does show that very large

sums, estimated at around $8 Billion in 1972 and more in 1973, can be
mobilized by LDCs with a minimum of strings, via international capital
markets. There is, however, some truth to the criticism that the Eurodollar
market is still a fragile and limited capital market.

For example, LDC

borrowing has been heavily in the form of bank loans with maturities of
not much more than 10 years and with floating interest rates; the market
for long-term LDC bonds has not expanded very r:uch yet.

The continuity

of these flows is far fran assured.
It is time to consolidate LDC advances in the Eurodallar market by
extending them to the national capital markets of DCs.

Restrictive rules

on DC imports of LDC debt paper, inherited often frOiil the 1930s, have
survived almost intact,·even as the corresponding rules for cocnnodity
imports were gradually liberalized during the post-war.

Those restrictive
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rules may sometim es appear not to be binding simply because the discoura ge
ment they signal preclude s the actual testing of the limits they impose.
Frequen tly, the rules on debt inports are not just restrict ive, formally
or informa lly, but also discrim inatory.

Thus, in sane DC nationa l capital

markets only favored LDCs, u~ually ex-colo nies, are allowed to place their
debt papers.

At a time when interna tional monetar y reform is being dis

cussed, certainl y these are matters which ~eserve a close review by DCs and
LDCs.

The payoff could be substan tial, not only in increase d capital

availab ility to LDCs and lower borrowin g costs, but also in decreas ing
the politic al friction s associa ted with other forms of capital transfe r
between DCs and LDCs.

Possible large financi al surpluse s of some oil

exportin g states support

the need to develop and strength ~n world

financi al markets .
It could be argued that easier access to externa l capital markets will
only benefit large, resourc e-rich LDCs, with a diversif ied or very lucra
tive export bill.

However , even small, undiver sified LDCs have been borrow

ing in the Eurodol lar market.

Furtherm ore, smaller LpGs could band togethe r

to enter interna tional capital markets , as the relative ly poor Central
America n countrie s have done.

In some cases, more prospero us LDCs could

guarante e the debt instrum ents of less fortunat e LDCs.

Regiona l and sub

regiona l developm ent banks could be used as instrum ents in these activiti es,
in the same fashion that similar institut ions could be used by small and
medium size LDCs to handle their joint search for, and purchas e of, foreign
technolo gy.

Organiz ations would thus be created or strength ened to improve

the conditio ns of access to world markets by the smaller mes, institut ions
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which crul<l be turned around to accelerate cor.unercial integration within
the ;:;roup if world market circuustances turned adverse.

Had !...:itin .4.1:.1erica

developed such institutions during the 1920s, its crash industrializati on
prograi:is during 1930-1945 ~!Ould have been probably both more ar.ihitious
and rational.
LDCs cornr.1itted to a mixed dcnestic economy plus active links to
world cor..tiodity and financial markets will find a growing need for
sophisticated management in their fiscal, monetary and exchange rate
policies.

Hhile those world r.1arkets during the 1970s have opened up neu

options for LDCs, they also lirait freedom of action regarding the~ of
daaestic policy instruments.

The kind of free-wheeling experimentation

with domestic policy tools which many mixed economy LDCs under,;;,ent
durine the 1950s has now become riskier and potentially cost:lier.
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XI.

A Few Final Remarks
This paper has been written around two basic working hypotheses,

one political and one economic.

The former assumes a multipolar world,

with several ~ajar centers of political and military power, all limited
in their l1er,emonic preteasions by the nuclear stalemate.

Out of such

political underp:.:,:-:.::;:;s, relatively free international mark~ts could
provide a plau~;ib.ie neci1anisu for interdependence among the citizens cif
different states.

The basic economic hypothesis, which has a somewhat

nee-Leninist flavor, is that for the foreseeable future the North will
have a substantial and growing excess demand for Southern cor:unodities,
mainly but not exclusively for primary products, plus· an excess supply of
finance capital, a supply which could be enlarged by the surplus funds of
some oil-rich LDCs.

The North can also be expected to maintain an excess

supply of new technology and capital goods.

Handled via relatively open

international markets, those circumstances can yield gains for all parti
cipants.
Much of t:1is, of course, is alread:r ~appenin~~

But those markets

are still quite imperfect, and will always be at the mercy of political
decisions regardin3 whether·and how they will be allowed to operate.
Those in LDCs and DCs interested in obtaining both economic efficiency
and national autonomy would do well to use whatever bargaining power
they have to strengthen those markets.

The Southern countries are not

without bargaining strengths, and can be expected to use them with in
creasing sophistication to achieve less asymnetrical international econ0t:1ic
relations.

Their potential bargaining strength arises not only from

conflicts at:1ong the Uorthem count.ries, but also fron clashes of interest
among <lifferent groups w·ithin industrialized states. 25
Besides concessional aid to the poorest LDCs, there trill reoain sone
areas of econcwic interaction between DCs and LDCs where it may be
difficult to even ina~ine the operations of decentralized narkets, and
where poltical C:.2cisionn will have to be quite open and explicit, often
involvinG the creation of supra-national authorities to regulate economic
activity.

An

obvious exax:1ple involves the economic use of the cor:inons

of nankind, particularly the seas and the seabed assets for
ownership titles.

r- 1hich

nobody has

The only alternative to an explicity political settlement

in this area, where potentially large pure rents are up for grabs, is a de facto
. . 1 an d mi· 1 1.tary
·
or de jure enclosure novenent using technologica1 , po1 1.t1.ca
pmver.
~

Leav1ng aside difficulties associated with non-appropriated resources,
it is perhaps uorth eophasizing that one should not exaggerate the ease of
obtaining, even granting political willincness to do so, efficient,
stable and competitive world commodity markets, particularly for exhaustible
natural resources.

Hotions of different discount rates, intergenerational

equity, conservation and inevitable uncertainties about future technologies
greatly complicate the picture, heating up the scramble for control of large
rents.

If, as in the case of oil, sellers of those commodities generate

surpluses, for which investments ·with small risk and reasonable returns are
difficult to find without the cooperation of COllltlodity buyers, the tangle
becomes monumental, even if producers and buyers were many and competitive.
Some politization of these markets may. thus be inevitable, except perhaps
in a

world where natural resources were evenly divided among 350 countries

having 10 million inhabitants each.

26
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::ore 13enerally, it is <lifficult to visualize any futcre international
cor.::1unity ~ith even nini:.1ua clains to lq:;it:i..-:1acy an<l fairness whic!1 would
e.'(clude LDCs fror.1 negotiations scttlin:3 \.:orldwide econouic i:1atters either
directly or by establishinG nar:"et rules of the gane.

Full L.TJC participa

tion in international tra<le a,1d nonetary reforn discussions, even if it
spoils past clubby atmospi1ereg, 2 7 should thus be regarded not as an absent
minded concession by DCs, but as a first step toward full WC participation
in world economic planning.

FOOTI~OTES

*An earlier draft of this paper benefitte d zreatly from criticism s
received during a conferenc e held at the Brookings Institutio n on
January 10-12, 1974.

Detailed comments from

c.

Fred Bergsten, Benjamin

I. Cohen, Richard :'.1. Cooper, William Diebold, Jr., Gerald K. Helleine r,

Alberto. Hir.:c·,!~,:a:i., Lm:rence B. Krause, Charles P. Kindlebe rger, Vahid
Nowshirv ani and Gustav Ranis are also gratefull y acknowled ged.

Many of

the ideas in this paper were either picked up from the work of Stephen
Hymer, or were developed as a reaction to his stimulati ng thought.

This

paper is dedicated to his memory.

1

see, for example, Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, New Haven:

Yale Universit y Press, 1966, and Hollis B. Chenery, "Alternat ive Strate
gies for Developm ent," paper presented to the Rehovot Conferenc e on
Economic Growth and Developin g Countries , September 1973.
2
This paragraph paraphras es William R. Cline, "Income Distribut ion and
Economic Developm ent:

A Survey and Tests for Selected Latin American

Cities," paper prepared for ECIEL Internati onal Conferenc e on Consumpt ion,
Income and Prices, Hamburg, October 1973, P• 50.
3
As put by Premier Chou En-lai, in his report to the 10th National Con
gress of the Chinese Communist Party:
"They content as well as collude with each other.
Their collusion serves to the purpose of more intensifi ed

contention.

Contention is absolute and protracted, where

as collusion is relative and temporary."
New York TL~es, 1 Septeober 1973, p. 6.
As an exauple of what the cartelized world would look like, consider
the follo~-.1ing remarks of IIr. Harold Geneen, President of ITT:
"Uhat these countries [the LDCs] need most are long
tena investments.

If our government is not going to

support us, there is going to be less investment.
answer may be a multinational approach.

The

By this I mean

the Ge·rmana, the Swiss, the World Bank, and others share
. in the investment.
one.

Then six cotmtries are involved, not

If something goes wrong, the countries can get tough

and do things.

You don't go to l?ar, but maybe everybody

refuses to give the offending country credits."
Business \leek, 3 November 1973, p. 44.
411 To achieve efficiency
in world production it is unnecessary that both
commodities and factors move freely.

e

•

If it were not for the problem

of transporting interest payments • • • one mobile factor will be suffi
cient to ensure price equalization."

Robert A. Mundell, International

Economics, New York, The Macmillan Canpany, 1968. p. 95.

In this barter

model interest is paid in the form of commodities.
5

some have argued that this last statement exaggerates the adjustment

·burden borne by migrant workers already residing in Western Europe, claim
ing that changes in the demand for labor are mainly reflected in the
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gross inflow rate of fresh guest workers.
remains.

Nevertheless, a real burden

The Economist of London reported in its issue

for 26 January

1974, p. 43, in a story entitled "Holiday at Your Peril," reluctance
among Turkish workers in the Federal Republic of Gennany of returning
home for ri.ew year holidays, for fear of being fired while they were away.
The report added:
" ••• how do the foreign workers, who make up a tenth of
the German labour force, feel?

Very frightened indeed•••

The way to protect Geman workers, and at the same
time avoid paying out millions of marks in unemployment
benefits, would seem to be to encourage a million or so
foreigners to go hane.

The problem is how.

One idea that has been kicked around ••• is that the
foreign workers should be given a departing financial
handshake •••
effective.

Other, cruder, methods are rather more
At local level, a wink from an employer to a

local authority can result in the non-renewal of work and
residence permits.

Or accommodations that used to be con

sidered acceptable can suddenly become 'uninhabitable' • "
6
The Economist of London, 9 February 1974, p. 48.

The same article

reports that Germany plans an outright ban on further guest-workers hirings
in cities with an immigrant population of more than a quarter of the total,
a kind of crude rule-of-thumb restriction much lamented when imposed by
LDCs on DFI.
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7

In an article info ming readers on the editorial page of The 1{.1.ll

Journal, 13 Deceraber 19i2,

~ tree t

p. 22, that "the relations anonc; nations are

governed by a few fragile convenant s which we call internati onal lau, by
soue vague consensus of ~rnrld opinion vhich Pe call internati onal r::orality
and, above all, by comnon se?-se," the Henry Luce Professor of Urban Values
at New York Universit y, Dr. Irving Kistol, goes on to say:
"Gunboats are as necessary for internati onal order as
police cars are for domestic order.

Smaller nations are

not really worried about AI:lerican atom boobs
the Hafia is.

any more than

And smaller nations are.. not going to behave

reasonabl y--with a decent respect for the interests of others,
including the great powers--u nless it is

costly to them to

behave unreasona bly."
8

see the stimulati ng article by Walker Connor, ''Nation-B uilding or

Nation-D estroying ,", in Horld Politics (April 1972), pp. 319-355.

He

charges that theoretic ians of LDC nationali sm and "nation-b uilding" have
slighted problems associate d with ethnic diversity .

One could speculate

that in the same fashion economis ts have sought to define optimal currency
areas, political scientist s could attempt defining optimal nation-st ates,
bearing in mind ethnic diversity , which plays the role of factor imnobilit y
in limiting larger optimal areas.
9

The Keynes plan for commodit ies, recently unearthed fran British

archives by Dr. Lal Jayawarde na and to be published in a forthcomi ng issue
of the

Journal

of Internati onal Economic s, deserves at least a fresh look

..
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in discussions about a new international monetary and economic order.
Ihe second draft dated Decerr~er 1942 opens by referring to the fourth
point of the Atlantic Charter, quoted above.

Note that the Keynes plan coupled

"freedom of access" for DCs to "freedom of sales" at predictable pi;ices for LDCs,
a point ignored by most DC o~servers and officials.

In his original draft,

Keynes starts by calling for the internationaliz ation of Vice-President
Wallace's "ever-nomal granary."

I recently heard a brilliant mainstrean

US political economist justify-US bans on its wheat exports; he went on to
argue that wheat sales should only be permitted to foreign countries
willing to sign long term-purchase agreements.

He was clearly sur-

prised by, and failed to answer, a question as to whether he also
advocated long term contracts for US

purchases of primary products.

It is not without certain irony that the same officials who not long
ago turned down Venezuelan requests for greater access to the US
market now complain of unreliability of foreign oil supplies.

oil

lt is

also ironic that as late as September 13, 1973,. The New York Times, p. 71,
reported attempts by

US diplomats to organize a boycott of Libyan oil.

lOS ee w··11·
1. 1.am D. Nordhaus, "The Allocation of I:nergy Resources,"
Brookings Papers~ Economic Activity, 3:

1973, pp. 529-571.

Using

energy as an example of exhaustible resou~ces,_and noting that besides
the basic economic problems (lack of futures markets, uncertainty about
future technology, etc.), political interference is also present, Nordhaus
remarks:
"It takes an act of faith to b'elieve that "the market"
can somehow see the proper allocation through this tangle

-.

of complexit y, uncertain ty, and politics" (p. 538).
11

The improveme nt of LDC foreien trade policies by itself cannot be

expected to provide automatic ally in all countries substanti al help in
achieving developme nt targets~ beside faster growth, not related directly
to the foreign trade sector.

For exarlple, export prcmotion policies may

in some countries hurt equity in inco~e distribut ion (by much or little),
while helping equity in others (by much or little).

leither qualitati ve

nor quantitat ive generaliz ations appear warranted regarding the link
between. trade policies arid income distribut ion.

The problem, relevant

also for DCs, is that different positive theories of trade have different

implicati ons for incane distribut ion and, therefore , for political attitudes
toward freer trade.

If one believes, for example, that the key source of

canparati ve advantage for a given country is a large endowment of capital
to labor, one will expect _!!!, capitalis ts to be pro-trade biased as
compared to.!!!_ laborers.

But if the key source of comparati ve advantage

is best explained by research and developme nt in new products,

industrie s

leading in that field will be the main champions of freer trade.
12

rn passing, it may be noted that tourism is-made more palatable to host

countries by t~e applicati on of the Calvo doctrine to foreign guests.
·:··.+···

The

.

occassion al injustice s suffered by DC tourists at the ~ands of unscrupulous LDC officials abusing the Calvo doctrine has not led to many calls
for internati onal arbitrati on tribunals , a~ far as I know, but to some
passable popular songs, like Tijuana Jail.

Neverthe less, it shoula be noted

that alleged fears for the lives of DC nationals happening to be visiting
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a given LDC going through acute po1itical turmoil, have been used as excuse
to land DC "guest troops" (without visas or tourist cards) into LDCs.
13

See, for exaople, Constantine Vaitsos, "Transfer of Resources

and Preserv~tio n of ::fo::iopoly Rents," iui.meogrrq,;1cd~ April 1970; Jorge M. Katz,
"Patents, the Paris convention and less developed countries," Yale
Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 190, November 1973; and
Edith Penrose, "Internatio nal patenting and the less developed countries,"
The Economic Journal, September 1973, pp. 768-86.
14

Jagdish Bhagwati anrl lJilliat1 Dallalfar have advanced a concrete

prope>sal along these lines in their paper, "The Brain Drain and Income
Taxation:

A Proposal," Working Paper No. 92, H.I.T. Department of Economics,

September- 1972.
15s

.
. Araerica,
•
ee Business
Latin

12 December 1973, pp. 393-394.

Canadian

subsidiarie s of US-owned firms have also been plagued by this issue.

Re

cently, a Canadian political leader asked:
"On what basis is it necessary for the Canadian
Government to request the intercessio n of a foreign
government in an export deal between a Canadian company
and some other company?"
The New York Times, 6 March 1974, p. 47.

Sane hope exists that the US

will finally decide to end its extraterrit orial claims on foreign sub
sidiaries of US-owned firms during 1974.
16
See report in Business ~ , 8 December 1974 ("A Warm Hand for US
Business"), pp. 24 and 27.

The Wall Street Journal reported on 30 August
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1973, p. 8, tl1at Senator Lloyd Bentsen of Texas had personally appeared in
court to express his re::3ervations about the Canadian attempts to purchase
Texasgulf, Inc.
17111a l:Iyint, "Inten1ational Trade and the Developing Countries," in
P.A. Samuelson, editor, International Economic Relations, MaCI:1illan,
London, 1969, p. 35.
18

Ronald I. HcKinnon, Money and Capital~ The Brookings Institution,

Washington, D.C., 1973, p. 172.

Both Myint and McKinnon refer favorably

to the Japanese experience during the Meiji period.
19william

s.

Gaud, ''Private Investment and Local Partnership, 11 speech

at a Financial Times conference on the European Community and the Third
World, 7 November 1973, pp. 2-4.

The same speech notes the, sensitivity

of the Euro-currency market to speculative waves, and the difficulty of
planning investments i:mder the Eurodollar regime of floating interest
rates.

It should be noted that Mr. Gaud recognizes positive feature in

LDC Eurodollar market borrowing.
20
see Charles P. Kindleberger, "Less Developed Countries and the Inter
national Capital Market," in Industrial Organization and Economic Development,
In Honor of E.S. Mason, edited by Jesse W. Markham and Gustav
Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1970, pp. 337-349.

v.

Papanek,

See also Richard N. Cooper

and Edwin M. Truman, "An Analysis of the Role of International Capital
Markets in Providing Funds to Developing Co\llltries, 11 Weltwirtschaftliches
Archiv, June 1971, Number 2 1 pp. 153-182.

It should be clear that interna-

1-

-ixtional bankers must not be credited with extraordina ry angelic virtues, and
LDCs ~ust be on guard to prevent 1920s-type abuses arising from high
pressure salesoanshi p, nore recently associated with suppliers' credits.
21

Aid, particularl y bilateral aid, is likely to be tied not only to com

modities fror.1 the donor country, but also to accepting donor country's
direct forei;n investuent.

As expressed by the US Secretary of the Treasury,

Dr. George P. Schultz:
"Every sovereii;n nation has, of course, the right
to regulate the terms and conditions under which private
investment is admitted or to reject it entirely.

Uhen

such capital is rejected, we find it difficult to understand that official donors should be asked to fill the gap."
•
The New York Times, 26 September 1973, P•
22Th.1s

s.

.
.
viewpoint
is eloquently presented by I.G. Patel, "Aid Relation-

ship for the Seventies," in Barbara Ward ~ .!!_, Editors, i'ne Widening Gap;
Development in the i970's, (New York:
pp. 295-334.

Columbia University Press, 1971),

See also Alberto. Hirschman and Richard M. Bird, "Foreign

Aid--A Critique and A Proposal," Princeton Essavs in Internation al Finance,
No. 69, July 1968.
23

See Gerald K. Helleiner, "The Less Developed Countries and the Inter-

national Monetary System," Journal of Development Studies, forthcoming
during 1974..

Some LOCs, confident in their resources and macroeconom ic mana~e

ment, may consider that disturbance s are more likely to arise outside than in
side their economies, and therefore will use changes in their exchange rate to
shield themselves from inflation coming from the industrializ ed world.

For

example, Venezuela has revalued its currency with respect to the dollar in
recent years for this purpose.
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24

rnflationary LDCs 1 i.e., those whose price levels rise chronically

at a faster rate than the ,;orld price level, o:- that of the major industrial
countr:· to "i1ich tliey ,:ould othen,ise pei;, nay nl~o have a ler,itimate
claim to larger reserves if all their crawlinG pegs achieve is the
elimination of the difference in inflationary trends, without seriously
smoothing out. other sources df balance of paynents disturbances, which
may remain virulent in those countries.
25

. to
d ocument presented b y Tanzania
.
·
· point
see t h e outstand ing
Ont h is

the Lusaka conference of nonaligned states, Cooperation Acainst Poverty,
Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, United Republic of Tanzania, 1970.

26

Those confident of their technological and military muscle are

calling for just that.

The Wall Street Journal, 17 December 1973,

p. 14,

has editorially suggested that the US should withdraw from the UN Law
of the Sea conference, in the following tenns:
"Enough is enough.

For the sake of form, the

United States may as well send its negotiators to Vene
zuela and Vienna, though

there is much to recommend a

clean break. But the important thing is that the US govern
ment should free the petroleum and mining industries of
any caveats linked to some future treaty, and let them go
to work adding
27

to the world's store of available resources."

0n September 21, 1973, The Wall Street Journal, p. 12, reported

frOiil Nairobi that:
"For all their old complaints, though, officials of
industrial countries now find it difficult to suppress
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their lonr;ing for the days when they could '[;leet i-rithout

having to share every secret with, or explain every
technicality to, the Tanzanians and Chileans."

